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Abstract
Existing decision support systems (DSS) do not account for forest owner heterogeneity, nor do they explicitly 
model the reaction of forest owners to policy. Hence, current DSS are suitable for response analysis, but much less 
useful for policy impact assessment or forecasting. The current study presents a theoretical model of harvesting 
behavior which provides the basis for a simulation model, Expected Value Asymmetries (EVA), useful for analyzing 
how timber supply and forest characteristics are affected when forest owners differ as to responsiveness to 
information, risk aversion, and patience as regards postponement of harvesting revenues. The simulation results 
clearly indicate that the model is well adapted for considering forest owner heterogeneity when assessing the 
impact of policy on the inter-temporal development of forest resources and timber market conditions. Finally, it is 
outlined how EVA could integrate forest owner specific harvesting behavior in an augmented Decision Support 
System (DSS), thus addressing the inability of DSS operational at pan-European level to model the interaction 
between policy and forest management decisions.
Keywords: Forest policy; Forest owner; Timber supply; Information; 
DSS 
Introduction
A sizeable proportion of the forests in the European Union (EU) is 
in private hands [1], and private forest ownership is increasing in the 
forest-rich sub-regions of Central-East and Northern Europe [2]. Thus, 
considering the attitudes and objectives of private forest owners is 
important for ensuring that policy instruments are effective [3]. It is also 
important to recognize that forest owners are far from a homogeneous 
group as regards objectives and attitudes (see, e.g., [4-8]). 
Hence, efficient policy impact analysis requires the ability to model 
the interaction between policy and forest management decisions, also 
acknowledging the heterogeneity of forest owners. Existing Decision 
Support Systems (DSS) operational at pan-European level are somewhat 
lacking in this respect. In the instances where forest owner heterogeneity 
is accounted for, simplistic heuristic approaches are used. An example 
is the EUwood study (Hamburg University 2010) where forest owner 
harvesting behavior was linked to forest holding size, so that small 
forest holdings were assumed to result in a smaller percentage of the 
theoretical wood supply being available. Another prominent example is 
the EFSOS II study [9] (UNECE/FAO), which provided so called policy 
scenarios—depicting the outcome for the European forest sector when 
the priority of forest management is given to different objectives—for 
the assessment of trade-offs facing policymakers. Just as was the case 
in the EUwood study, the pan-European forest resource assessment 
model EFISCEN [10] was used both to provide estimates of potential 
wood supply, in EFSOS II ingested as a constraint on the production 
of wood products in the economic forest sector model EFI-GTM [11], 
and to project the future state of the forests given assumptions of future 
wood demand and pre-specified management regimes. 
The analysis in these two studies neither considered the reaction 
of forest owners to policy and the effect of forest owner heterogeneity 
on the inter-temporal development of forests, nor the logical feedback 
existing from the forest sector model to the forest resource assessment 
model. The latter constitutes a relevant problem, since multiple errors 
would propagate over time if the ‘actual’ quantity of harvested wood 
were set equal to this upper bound, without taking into account that 
the satisfaction of the demand might have required a lower harvesting 
level. Hence, this kind of modelling endeavors has its value for 
response analysis, but is not very useful for policy impact assessment 
or forecasting. 
Further, information is a commonly used policy instrument, 
not the least in the context of forest policy [12]. The importance of 
information as a policy tool is illustrated by considerable efforts spent 
by Member states of the EU on information, training and capacity 
building of private forest owners to foster wood mobilisation (Standing 
Forestry Committee ad hoc Working Group II 2008). Information as 
a policy tool certainly works by modifying the expectations of forests 
owners/managers about the future, e.g., concerning demand and 
prices, so that informed harvesting decisions are taken using updated 
expectations [13]. Consequently, policy impact analysis presupposes 
the ability to model the reaction of forest owners to policy in the form 
of information releases.
Thus, the current study aims to provide a theoretically founded 
framework to incorporate forest owner heterogeneity, including the 
asymmetric response to information, in a DSS. Departing from earlier 
studies using the Fisherian two-period consumption-saving-harvesting 
model [14-20], in particular Rinaldi and Jonsson [13], we develop a 
theoretical model of harvesting behavior when forest owners differ 
as to the receptiveness to information. This theoretical model is then 
used as the basis for a more complex simulation tool—Expected Value 
Asymmetries (EVA)—allowing for a higher degree of heterogeneity 
in terms of forest owners’ preferences. EVA is subsequently used to 
demonstrate how forest owner heterogeneity affects both the inter-
temporal development of forests and timber market conditions. 
Further, it is discussed how EVA, by working as an intermediary, could 
provide feedback from an economic forest sector model to a forest 
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resource assessment model, while at the same time ensuring that forest 
owner specific harvesting behavior is integrated in the DSS.
 The paper proceeds as follows: the next section presents the 
theoretical model, with particular emphasis on the modelling of 
uncertainty and information arrival. Then the policy simulation tool 
EVA is presented. Hereafter, simulation results are presented and 
discussed. The subsequent section outlines how EVA could be part of a 
DSS, completing the feedback loop between an economic model of the 
forest sector and a forest resource assessment model while at the same 
time ensuring that forest owner harvesting behavior is accounted for. 
The paper concludes with summary and conclusions. 
Theoretical Model
The theoretical model used here is simple and stylized. First of 
all, in order to derive analytical solutions, we consider a two-period 
economy, so that the optimal harvesting problem of each forest owner 
reduces to how much should be harvested immediately and how much 
in a(n) (indeterminate) future period. Further, for what concerns 
policy making, we simply assume that some unspecified policy is 
initiated at the beginning of period one, and forest owners perceive 
it as new information (i.e., a signal) regarding timber demand and 
prices. Policy design is obviously an issue of considerable importance. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper, whose focus specifically 
is the modelling of forest owners’ harvesting behavior.
The representation of policy through signals is particularly 
interesting, allowing the policy to be perceived as “good (news)” or 
“bad (news)” from the forest owner perspective. Further, it accounts 
for the circumstance that policy-effects might be perceived as long 
lasting and/or time contingent, and also for the specific degree of 
confidence of individual forest owners/managers (in the policy maker). 
The theoretical model exclusively focuses on direct economic risk (as 
opposed to biological risk), a choice that is at least partially supported 
by empirical evidence showing that private forest owners consider 
direct economic risk, such as price changes, much more important 
than indirect economic risk resulting from biological damage [21].
We consider a two-period economy in which two distinct groups, I 
and NI, of risk-averse private landowners want to maximize the utility 
derived from individual final wealth, by choosing how much to harvest 
in each period. Within each group landowners are identical, further we 
also assume that they all have the same utility index U, with exponential 
form and constant risk-aversion r, that is U=-exp(-rwj), where wj 
represents wealth at time 2 for an individual belonging to group j=I, 
NI. Besides having identical preferences, all the forest owners are also 
initially endowed by identical forests characterized by the same area, 
age, tree species and growth function.
Each landowner harvests in both periods, in particular, we denote 
by xji the quantity harvested at time i by a generic landowner belonging 
to group j. Given the amount harvested at time 1, xj1, the stock available 
at time 2 is uniquely defined by the growth function and the initial 
forest endowment Q. In addition, since we are assuming that utility 
derives from final wealth only, and that the rotations beyond the 
second period are ignored, it also follows that such a stock will be 
entirely harvested at time 2. For simplicity we will consider a linear 
growth function. Obviously such an assumption violates the concavity 
requirement, however, our analysis does not crucially rely on this 
specification, which instead allows for a reduction in the notational and 
computational complexity of the model. Therefore, we assume:
 xj2=k(Q-xj1) 0≤xj1≤Q                                                                            (1)
where Q is the initial forest stock, and k a positive constant.1
The demands for wood in both period, D1 and D2, are inelastic 
and unknown. We let pi be the price at which wood harvested at time 
i is sold on the wood market. Notice that, since the forest must be 
harvested completely at the end of the second period, and since demand 
is inelastic, our framework focuses only on the realization of the time 
1 equilibrium through the equilibrium price p1. Finally we assume that 
timber revenues p1xj1 are invested at time 1 on a risk free bond with 
gross return (1+ b), at time 2. 
Uncertainty
When the landowner makes his/her harvesting decision, the 
demand D1 and the timber prices are not known. However, all 
landowners know that p1 is derived as an equilibrium price, while they 
hold beliefs concerning the distributions of D1 and the dynamic of 
prices. In particular, both D1 and p2 are driven by a stochastic common 
component εa that can be thought of as a long-run economic shock 
affecting both periods (an example could, e.g., be a realization of the 
bioeconomy, creating a long-term increase in the demand for wood), 
and two time contingent shocks, εD and ε2, respectively. The variance of 
εa, σa², can be thought of as a measure of economic risk. The two shocks 
εD and ε2 are mutually independent, and, in addition, they are also 
independent from εa. Therefore, they represent specific time contingent 
shocks exclusively affecting time 1 (εD), and time 2 (ε2), respectively. 
Hence, σD² and σ2² can be thought of as measures of time specific 
risk. To make examples, one can imagine a temporary variation in 
exchanges rates affecting timber demands, or a provisional reduction 
in the activity of a major sawmill in the area in question.
Hence, D1=D(1+εa)+ εD and p2=p1(1+m)+εa+ε2, where m, D∈ℜ⁺⁺, εa 
∼N(0, σa²), εD ∼N(0, σD²), ε2 ∼N(0, σ2²). The constant D can be thought 
of as base demand level, and the percentage variation from it (εa) 
depends on the overall long-run economic development. In addition, 
the forest sector (and henceforth the demand) can be hit also by a time-
contingent shock εD, which will have no residual effect at time 2. The 
price at time 2, depends on the equilibrium price at time 1, the long-run 
economic shock, εa, and the time specific shock for time 2, ε2. Notice 
that, since the forest will be harvested at the end of the second period, 
only the demand in the first period is relevant for the analysis.2
For concreteness, we assume that m>b, for example one can 
imagine that m is a fixed inflation rate and, in absence of any additional 
information, forest owners/managers might assume that future timber 
prices will adjust for inflation.
Information Arrival
The model assumes that while uncertainty definitely resolves at time 
2, with the realization of the timber price, p2, some news concerning the 
forest sector already arrives at the beginning of time 1, through a signal 
s. In particular,
  s=αεa+ εD+εs                                                                                                                                                         (2)
where εs is a noise distributed according to εs∼N(0, σs²). Only the 
members of I are able to observe the signal, while the others ignore its 
existence. For simplicity, we normalize the total number of landowners 
to 1, and we assume that a fraction β of the entire group observes 
1 In particular, the possibility of obtaining corner or interior solutions to the 
maximization problem does not depend on this assumption. 
2 Obviously one could alternatively use more complex specifications D1=D(1+aεa)+εD 
and p2=p1(1+m)+bεa+ε2,, where a, b∈ℜ⁺⁺, however this would not add much to the 
results, while it would largely reduce tractability.
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Ωj is a strictly increasing transformation of the kernel E[wj|Ωj]-0.5 
rVar[wj|Ωj].
First Order Conditions
The first order conditions associated to the maximization problem 
(6) yield:
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Clearly, an increase in the expected growth rate of timber prices 
m, or a reduction in the risk free rate b reduces the short-run timber 
supplies from both groups, xI1 and xNI1. Vice versa, an increase 
in the time 1 price p1, or in the risk aversion coefficient r, or in the 
growth index k, increases both xI1 and xNI1, while an increase in the 
informativeness parameter α reduces xI1. The effect of an increase in 
risk (σ2² and σa²) on the short-run supply of group NI is clear, leading 
to an increase in the time 1 supply xNI1. The effect on xI1 is generally the 
same; however, there exist combinations of parameters for which an 
increase in risk induces a reduction in xI1. Finally, when the signal is 
received, the informed group displays a lower supply at time 1 than the 
uninformed one, ceteris paribus. 
Expected Equilibrium
The equilibrium price is computed by equalizing total timber 
supply at time 1, to the expected time 1 demand, given the available 
information, that is E[D1| Ω j]. Specifically, assuming that the correct 
expected demand is indeed D+γDs, or, equivalently that the signal is not 
biased on purpose, the expected time 1 equilibrium price p*1 solves the 
equation βxI1+(1-β)xNI1=D+γDs, that is:
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( )
[ ] ( )
2 2 2 2 2
2 2*
1 2 2 2
2
2 2
2
2 2 2
2
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1
...
(1 ) (1 ) 1
p
a aI D
p
a a
p
a
p
a a
rk
p Q D s
m k r
ks
m k r
αγ σ σ σ σ
γ
σ σ β αγ σ
β γ σ σ
σ σ β αγ σ
   − + +  = − − × +
 + − + + − − 
+
−
 + − + + − − 
 
                                                                                                                 (9)
Notice that, if the entire population was made by I forest owners, 
time 1 expected demand would still be E[D1|s]= D+γDs., while it would 
be D if only the NI group was present. In these two particular cases, the 
expected equilibrium prices for the groups would be pI*1 and by pNI*1 
respectively:
pI*1=(Q-D-γDs)  ( )
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pNI*1 is also the equilibrium price that would realize if no signal was 
sent, in particular notice that pI*1<pNI*1.
Neither the price pI*1 nor pNI*1 realizes at the equilibrium, since 
the overall population of forest owners is in fact made up by the two 
groups. 
In particular, pI*1<p*1<pNI*1, so that the heterogeneity of landowners’ 
population implies that the I (NI) group is asked to satisfy less than 
the entire demand, but at a higher (lower) price than pI*1 (pNI*1). An 
the signal, while the remaining 1-β does not. The signal is essentially 
the perceived effect of some unspecified policy. In particular, this 
construction implicitly assumes that forest owners and managers 
regard any type of policy as affecting demand for wood and prices, 
and henceforth their expected values. For concreteness, here we will 
consider a policy viewed as beneficial that could possibly increase 
demand and prices, that is, s>0.
σs² is a measure of the precision of the signal, since higher σs² induces 
also higher variability of the signal and, therefore, lower precision 
(we refer the reader to [7] for the comparative statics analysis on σs²). 
However, notice that σs² could also be interpreted as the (inverse) 
degree of confidence into the policy maker.
α[0,1] represents the degree to which the signal is specific to the 
entire time horizon. If α=1, the signal is also partially informative about 
the long-run shock εa, and, consequently, about p2. On the contrary, 
if α=0, the signal exclusively brings information contingent to time 1, 
and it cannot be used to infer the timber price realization at time 2. In 
concrete, one can imagine that, when the signal is announced, each 
forest owner (in group I) evaluates its degree of specificity.
The informativeness of the signal with respect to the demand and 
the timber price, respectively is defined as usual as γ D=cov(s, D1)/var(s) 
and γ p=cov(s, p2)/var(s). Given our assumptions, s, p2|s and D1|s are also 
normally distributed. In particular, standard Bayesian updating leads 
to:
 p2|s∼N(p1(1+m)+sγ p , (1-αγ p)σa²+σ2²)                                             (3)
 D1|s∼N(D+sγ D , (1-(α / D)γ D)D2σa²+(1-γD)σD²)                             (4)
If not explicitly mentioned otherwise, in the following we will 
assume that α≠0. Obviously, we also assume Q-D-sγ D>0.
Landowners’ heterogeneity, information and equilibrium 
pricing
At the beginning of period 1, all the forest owners are endowed 
with a forest stock Q, and growth of the forest is described by (1) above. 
Each landowner invests the revenues p1xj1 from timbers harvested at 
time 1, xj1, in a risk free bond with gross return 1+r. Hence, within each 
group, the maximization problem consists in choosing optimal current 
timber supply xj1, in order to maximize the utility from final wealth wj.
Given harvesting levels xj1, xj2, final wealth at time 2 is:
 wj=p2xj2+ p1xj1(1+b)                                                                                (5)
where xj2 is given by (1).
Before the harvesting and investment decisions are taken, members 
of group I receive some news concerning the forest sector by means of 
a signal s=αεa+ εD + εs. This information is then used within the group 
to update the priors on D1 and p2, and henceforth to choose optimal 
contingent harvesting xI1. More generally, both groups choose optimal 
harvesting at time 1, given the available information Ωj. In particular 
Ωj is represented by the signal for landowners belonging to group I 
while it is an empty set for the others, so that ΩI=s and ΩNI=∅. The 
maximization problem becomes:
 jxMax 1
 E[p2xj2+ p1xj1(1+b) |Ωj ] j=I,NI                                           (6)
under the constraint given by (1).
Since p1 is taken as given and p2|Ωj is normally distributed, so is 
w|Ωj. Further, the utility index is a standard constant risk aversion 
exponential utility, so that the expected utility of wj given information 
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increase in β, that is, in the proportion of informed landowners reduces 
the equilibrium price as expected, in the extreme case of β=1, pI*1= p*1. 
This finding has concrete implications since it directly implies that 
increased information penetration reduces the (equilibrium) price for 
timber (Figure 1).
Methodology
Expected value asymmetries: a harvesting behavior model
In this Section, we present a prototype tool based on the framework 
introduced above for general harvesting behavior forecasting and 
policy simulation. Our model, Expected Value Asymmetries, or shortly 
EVA, expands the framework analyzed above by considering five 
possible categories of forest owners, differing in terms of risk aversion 
and patience as regards postponing harvesting revenues, as detailed 
below. With the exclusive purpose of facilitating the analysis, the results 
presented here are based on the assumption that the initial growing 
stocks and growth rate are identical among the five categories. In what 
follows we will first detail the way we have expanded the framework 
introduced in the previous Sections, also providing a characterization 
of the five categories, and then present some result obtained from the 
analysis conducted in EVA.
As already mentioned, forest owners differ in their purposes, 
degree of information, and risk attitudes concerning their forests. To 
reflect this heterogeneity, we have assigned to each category of forest 
owners two coefficients: risk aversion, r, and degree of patience with 
respect to postponing harvesting income, q. In particular, we assign 
weights, 1-q and q, to monetary wealth from timber sale at time 1 and 
time 2, respectively, and we modify (5) assuming that individuals want 
to maximize the utility of final weighted wealth wqj=(q)p2xj2+ +(1-q)
p1xj1(1+r), 0≤q≤1.
The use of the pair (1-q,q) allow us to express a degree of patience 
with respect to monetary outcomes realized in the future (as opposed 
to present ones), in particular, if q=0, the landowner only values 
monetary outcomes realized from current timber sale, while the 
opposite is true if q=1. When q=0.5 instead, monetary outcomes from 
current and future timber sale are equally valued. A higher degree of 
patience (0.5≤q<1) signalizes that the forest owner assigns the forest 
additional value beside the one provided by timber sales, and therefore 
is keen on carrying a larger forest stock to the future, even if this might 
not be optimal from a pure monetary perspective. This might be the 
case for example if the forest is part of an inheritance to be left to the 
children, or if has high ecological value, or if it provides non-monetary 
amenity services. 
In creating forest owner typologies, we draw on earlier studies 
creating and analyzing private forest owner typologies [4-8]. We build 
in particular on Ingemarson et al. [7] in considering the following five 
categories of forest owners: Urban Dweller (UD), Economic Man, 
Elderly Couple, Green Values, and Multi-objective. In choosing the 
number and characteristics of forest owner categories, particular 
attention was made so as to allow sufficient variation as well as a 
continuum as regards objectives, and associated risk aversion and 
patience with respect to monetary outcomes. Here follows a brief 
description of the types:
I. Urban Dweller, being detached from his/her forest holding, 
has no clear objective with respect to his/her forest holding, and is not 
interested in, or receptive to, information/policies regarding forests. In 
light of the theoretical framework presented above, he/she belongs to 
the NI group. Since in essence the forest is not valued, risk aversion 
(rUD) is low, for the same reason, the forest is left un-harvested in the 
first period, so that the patience coefficient qUD is set to 1.
II. Economic Man has as overriding objective the maximization 
of the monetary value of the forest, no matter if it comes from present 
or future timber sale, equivalently, the patience coefficient qEM is at 
intermediate level. Risk aversion (rEM) is also at intermediate level, and 
he/she is informed about possible policies affecting the timber market. 
III. Elderly Couple’s main purpose is to leave the holding in 
as favorable (economic) condition for their children as possible. 
Consequently, the value of wealth from current timber sale is low 
(equivalently, patience (qEC) is high) and risk aversion (rEC) concerning 
future timber market conditions is high. For the same reasons, the 
Elderly Couple also tries to collect information on policies affecting the 
timber market.
IV. Green Values’ main objective is promoting non-timber 
values, e.g., biodiversity and recreation. The value of monetary wealth 
from current timber sale, and consequently the opposite of patience 
(1-qGV), is relatively small, since postponing final felling sustains non-
timber values for a longer period. Risk aversion (rGV) is fairly low. 
Information concerning timber markets is ignored, so that Green 
Value belongs to the NI group. 
V. Multi-objective values both monetary and amenity 
(non-timber) benefits of forest holdings. Risk aversion (rMO) is at 
intermediate/high levels and, due to amenity valuation, patience qMO 
with respect to future timber sales is fairly high. Information about the 
future evolution of timber markets is collected and valued.
Next, we rank the five categories according to risk aversion 
(r) and the degree of patience with respect the future (q). From the 
lowest to the highest risk aversion (r) we have: Urban Dweller, 
Green Values, Economic Man, Multi-objective, and Elderly Couple 
(rUD<rGV<rEM<rMO<rEC). Similarly, from the highest coefficient q to the 
lowest: Urban Dweller, Elderly Couple, Multi-objective, Green Values, 
and Economic Man (qUD>qE >qMO>qGV >qEM). 
Since all groups maximize the utility form economic wealth only, 
we assume that the risk aversion coefficient (r) ranges over 2 and 4, 
as typically assumed in standard economic theory [22]. Therefore we 
assume: (Table 1).
Next, we derive for each group the first order condition 
corresponding to the maximization problem (6), wherein (5) has been 
replaced by the expression for final weighted wealth (wqj). We then 
solve for the equilibrium (i.e. for the optimal short run timber supply 
of each group and the equilibrium price) by setting to zero the system 
formed by the five first order conditions derived before and the market 
clearing condition that equalizes total period 1 supply to the expected 
demand. 
It should be noted that the ranking and the numerical assignment to 
the various parameters are informed estimates only, based on a number 
of studies of forest owner attitudes [4-8]. For example, the high degree 
of the patience of the Elderly Couple is derived from Ingemarson et al. 
[7], where the category, or objectives cluster, ‘‘traditionalists’’, which 
rUD=2 rGV=2.5 rEM=3 rMO=3.5 rEC=4
qUD=1 qGV=0.55 qΕM=0.5 qMO=0.6 qEC=0.9
Table 1: Preferences parameters per category: rUD, rGV rEM, rMO, rEC risk aversion 
coefficients for Urban Dweller (UD), Green Values  (GV), Economic Man (EM), 
Multi-objective (MO) and Elderly Couple (EC); qUD, qGV qEM, qMO, qEC patience 
coefficients for Urban Dweller (UD), Green Values  (GV), Economic Man (EM), 
Multi-objective (MO) and Elderly Couple (EC).
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inspired our Elderly Couple, is the one that to the largest extent expects 
children or other relatives to take over the forest estate. Accordingly, we 
assume that Elderly Couple, wishing to hand over a well-stocked forest 
holding, are less concerned with wealth from current timber sales. 
In addition, a number of simplifications are implicitly assumed, 
such as inelastic demand and the absence of any budget or consumption 
requirements for the forest owners. However, as already pointed out, 
our purpose is not to launch a fully operative tool for policy-analysis, 
but rather to demonstrate some lines along which our theoretical 
framework could be elaborated for more applied research. In addition, 
there exist studies providing an empirical basis for the quantification 
of some of the parameters, e.g., the distribution of growing stock on 
different owner categories (see, e.g., Favada et al. [9]).
Simulation Results and Discussion
In this section we present some of the research questions that could 
be addressed by the module EVA. We start by considering questions 
related to how forest owner heterogeneity affects the state of the forest 
resources and the timber market, and then we reassess the situation, 
considering also the effects of policy (unspecified, but with market 
implications).
Forest owner heterogeneity and forest development
Let us assume that the growing stock at time 1 is equally partitioned 
among the five categories, so that 20% of the growing stock (the one 
owned by Urban Dweller) is unmanaged, in the sense that no harvesting 
activities take place. Further, we assume that 20% of the entire growing 
stock is interesting from a biodiversity perspective (BIO in Figure 2), 
and it is entirely owned by a single category, while the remaining 60% 
is mainly valuable for timber (WOOD in Figure 2). We are interested in 
analyzing the composition of the growing stock at time 2, depending on 
whether the BIO area is owned by Multi-objective or Economic Man. 
The answer is provided in Figure 3a and 3b below: clearly, the 
unmanaged proportion (31.43%) is the same as this area is owned by 
the Urban Dweller in both examples, while if the BIO proportion is 
owned by Multi-objective, it will also represent a higher percentage of 
the total growing stock at time 2. Indeed, the higher degree of risk-
aversion of the Multi-objective with respect to the Economic Man 
would on one side induce a higher short-run harvest level; however, 
for this particular parameters’ assignment, this effect is more than 
compensated by the opposite one generated by the higher degree 
of patience of Multi-objective, which instead reduces short-time 
harvesting in favor of a higher growing stock available at time 2.
 Though the quantitative findings strictly depend on the chosen 
values of the parameters, the results derived through the EVA model 
are interesting per se, in a qualitative sense. Indeed, in essence, the 
model simply computes the equilibrium, allowing for forest owner 
heterogeneity. The graphs above show that, independently from 
the numerical specifications adopted, such heterogeneity makes the 
distribution of forest land on owner types non-trivial. Hence, given 
that private forest owners are a heterogeneous group; our results 
highlight the necessity to consider forest ownership when producing 
policy analysis and forest resource outlooks.
Forest owner heterogeneity and the timber market
Next we compare how timber market characteristics (namely 
timber equilibrium price and market shares in the sense of shares 
of total timber supply) are affected by the heterogeneity in forest 
ownership. Specifically, we consider two alternative partitions of the 
forest growing stock: one that assigns 20% of the growing stock to 
Elderly Couple, 30% to Economic Man, and the remaining 50% equally 
between Multi-Objectives and Green Value, and one that assigns 30% 
of the growing stock to Elderly Couple, 20% to Economic Man, and 
the remaining 50% equally between Multi-Objectives and Green Value. 
The equilibrium price that realizes in the second case is some 9% 
lower than the one realized under the first partition. This results from 
the intrinsic value of wood being lower for the Elderly couple, whose 
degree of patience with respect to the future is higher. Figure 4a and 
4b below compare the market shares under the two possible partitions.
Forest owner’s heterogeneity and policy
When policy is considered, the EVA model accounts for the fact 
that different categories might have different degrees of confidence 
in the policy maker (1/σs² in the theoretical framework). Specifically, 
we rank those groups that are informed about forest policy according 
to their degree of confidence as follows (from the lowest to the 
highest): Elderly Couple, Multi-objective and Economic Man (as 
already mentioned, Green Values are assumed to be not receptacle for 
information that concerns timber market developments). In particular, 
σ2EM=0.02, σ2MO=0.04, and σ2EC=0.06.
Going back to the first example discussed in this Section, we assume 
that the BIO percentage is indeed owned by Economic Man, and that 
the policy maker would like to reduce the proportion of unmanaged 
stock and increase the one of BIO at time 2. The EVA model could 
then, e.g., be used for reassessing the composition of the growing stock, 
should the policy maker act in order to inform and train the Urban 
Dweller so that he/she will also eventually decide to harvest at time 
1. Henceforth, the Urban Dweller is induced to assign value to his 
monetary wealth from harvesting at time 1, according to the patience 
coefficient qUD=0.48, and his degree of confidence into the policy maker 
is pretty high with respect to the other categories, so that σ2UD=0.03. The 
result of such a simulation is shown in Figure 5 below: the growing stock 
at time 2 is reduced by 8.55%, however such a reduction is mainly due 
to the decrease of unmanaged stock (-58.28%) since both the BIO and 
the WOOD proportions increase (by 79.5% and 20.4%, respectively).
Next, we move to the third example considered above, and we 
analyze the effects on timber markets of two alternative policies: (a) one 
aimed at maintaining the actual market conditions and (b) one aimed 
at increasing the short-run supply of wood. The first policy consistently 
modifies the market shares (Figure 6a below), leaving the total supply 
unaffected, while the equilibrium price drops by some 14 percent. 
The second policy generates an additional minimal adjustment of the 
market shares (Figure 6b below) and a further reduction (3.8%) of the 
equilibrium price, while the short-run supply increases by 4.3% (and 
consequently the growing stock in the second period reduces 3.8%). 
Notice that this result might appear counterintuitive, however the 
contradiction is only illusory since the policy maker essentially acts as 
risk-reducer from a forest owner perspective.
In particular, the arrival of information (independently from its 
content) reduces the perceived variance as it appears in formula (3) and 
(4), and the results of our simulation also confirm this finding. Indeed, 
the introduction of the policy aimed at maintaining the actual market 
conditions reduces the first period’s individual supplies of all three 
informed groups (meaning of each landowner representing one of the 
three groups), as it appears in Figure 7, since the perceived variance of 
the second period’s price is reduced. Indeed, the absolute percentage 
variation in the short run supply is higher the higher is the coefficient of 
risk aversion (-13.1% for the Elderly Couple, -6.7% for Multi-Objective 
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and -1.5% for the Economic Man). Next, when the second policy is 
put in place, the content of the information becomes relevant, and the 
informed landowners raise both the expected value of the demand and 
the one of the future price (for given equilibrium price). 
Hence the overall result is a priori ambiguous, since one should sum 
the effect of the reduced variance (i.e., reduction of short-run supply) 
to the one of increased expected value, which in itself is uncertain 
since the increase in the expected demand (future price) increases 
(decreases) the short-run supply. In our simulation these contrasting 
forces are represented by a period one supply which is lower than the 
one without but higher than the one under the first policy considered. 
Again, the simulation results, in quantitative terms, depend on the 
chosen parameter values. Nevertheless, in a qualitative sense, they 
demonstrate the necessity to take into account the heterogeneity of 
forest owners when issuing policy initiatives.
A Suggested Augmented DSS
In this section it is outlined how EVA can integrate forest owner 
heterogeneity in an augmented DSS, linking a forest sector model with 
a forest resource assessment model.
EVA as part of a decision support system 
Figure 1: Expected value asymmetries: a harvesting behavior mode.
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Figure 2: Initial growing stock composition.
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Figure 3: Time 2 growing stock composition (a) BIO area owned by Economic 
Man, (b) BIO area owned by Multi-Objective.
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Figure 4: Market shares, (a) When the largest percentage (30%) of the growing 
stock is owned by Economic Man, (b) When the largest percentage (30%) of the 
growing stock is owned by Elderly Couple.
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Figure 5: Time 2 Growing stock composition after policy.
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The EVA model can work as an intermediary between a forest 
resource assessment model, (FRAM), such as, e.g., the European 
Forestry Dynamics Model (see https://gna.org/projects/efdm/) or 
EFISCEN [10], and an economic model for the forest sector (EMFS), 
such as, e.g., EFI-GTM [11]. In particular, EVA can complete the loop 
between the two models, using as inputs the maximum harvestable 
level from the FRAM and the demand for wood primary products from 
the EMFS, and returning as output the amount effectively harvested by 
different forest-owner categories, to be ingested in the FRAM. 
To explain the linkages between FRAM and EMFS more 
concretely, let us consider a FRAM belonging to the class of area-
matrix state transition models as first developed in Sallnäs [23], such as 
the aforementioned European Forestry Dynamics Model or EFISCEN, 
meaning that a separate area matrix is assigned to each forest type 
according to region, owner type, species, site class (Figure 7). The 
FRAM derives the total maximum harvestable level—given legal 
constraints, biodiversity considerations, etc.—ingested by the EMFS as 
upper bound to the supply of primary products (Figure 8).
Simultaneously, this information is also sent, at cell-level, to EVA 
along with information regarding forest growth rate and owner type, 
also at cell-level. EMFS derives the forest sector equilibrium and sends 
the demand for primary products to EVA. Given this information, 
for each cell EVA computes the amount to be harvested in order to 
maximize the utility from wealth of the respective forest owner under 
the resource constraint provided by FRAM and the requirement that 
the entire demand derived in FRAM has to be satisfied. EVA’s results 
are then fed back into FRAM completing the loop from EMFS to 
FRAM (Figure 8).
As knowledge concerning the distribution of forest land on 
different categories of forest owners is generally quite scant, ‘expert 
judgment’ is needed to allocate the forest resource on different owner 
types. Further, as already noted, the numerical assignment to the 
various parameters in EVA are to be regarded as informed estimates 
only. This lack of information makes frameworks as the one outlined 
above most suited for policy scenario analysis, since scenario analysis is 
better equipped to deal with indeterminacies caused by ignorance than, 
e.g., extrapolating methods [24,25]. 
Summary and Conclusions
Effective forest policy instruments require policy makers able 
to foresee what the harvesting reaction of private forest owners will 
be. This in turns depends on private forest owners’ specific attitudes 
and objectives. However, private forest owners do not constitute a 
homogenous group, as already noted in several studies. Existing DSS 
do not account for forest owner heterogeneity, nor do they explicitly 
model the reaction of forest owners to market and/or policy signals
The current study seeks to address these shortcomings by (i) 
explicitly considering different types of forest owners, and by (ii) 
focusing on the role of information as a policy tool. A theoretical model 
of timber supply that studies how information releases affect harvesting 
behavior when forest owners differ in the awareness or receptiveness to 
this information is developed. Under these conditions, an asymmetry 
arises, which affects equilibrium pricing and, consequently, also 
harvesting decisions. 
The theoretical model put forward permits information releases to 
influence forest owners’ expectations of timber demand and equilibrium 
pricing. Consequently, informed landowners display a lower short-run 
timber supply than uninformed ones, whereas increased information 
penetration lowers timber price. Thus, the framework has concrete 
policy implications, as it demonstrates how information can be used as 
a tool for influencing timber markets. 
This theoretical framework is then expanded, allowing for a higher 
degree of heterogeneity in terms of forest owners’ preferences: we 
assume five forest owner types, differing as to (i) the responsiveness 
to market related information, (ii) risk aversion, and (iii) patience as 
regards postponing harvesting revenues. This harvesting behavior 
model, EVA, can, as a form of ‘artificial laboratory’, be used for policy 
analysis. Further, by working as an intermediary, EVA could provide 
feedback from an economic forest sector model to a forest resource 
assessment model, while at the same time ensuring that forest owner 
specific harvesting behavior is integrated in a DSS.
Simulation results derived through EVA indicate that the model is 
ElderlyCouple         Multi-objective         Economic Man          Green Value
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Figure 6: Market shares, (a) After policy to keep total supply constant (30% of 
growing stock owned by Elderly Couple), (b) After policy aimed at increasing 
short-run timber supply (30% of growing stock owned by Elderly Couple).
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Figure 7: An area matrix state transition model.
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well adapted for modelling how forest owner heterogeneity and policy 
in the form of information release interact to affect the inter-temporal 
state of forest resources as well as the timber market. The numerical 
assignments to the various parameters of the EVA model are informed 
estimates only, derived from studies creating forest owner typologies. 
Further, in the simulation the distribution of forest land on the different 
categories is completely arbitrary. 
Hence, though there are some studies providing empirical support 
for the quantification of some of the parameters, more empirically 
based knowledge, with a greater geographical coverage - concerning 
risk preferences, receptiveness to market-related information, and 
the distribution of forest land on different types of forest-owners 
- would enhance simulation models like EVA and contribute to the 
implementation of effective policy instruments. Imperfect information 
makes EVA and modelling frameworks as the one outlined above 
mostly suited for policy scenario analysis, since scenario analysis is 
better equipped to deal with indeterminacies caused by ignorance than, 
e.g., extrapolating methods [24,25]. This, however, is a caveat valid for 
most, if not all, modelling activities.
List of Symbols
•	 U: utility function;
•	 r: risk-aversion coefficient
•	  wj: wealth at time 2 for an individual belonging to group j
•	 I: index identifying the group of informed landowners
•	 NI: index identifying the group of uninformed landowners
•	 xji: quantity harvested at time i by a generic landowner belonging 
to group j
•	 xj1: quantity harvested at time 1 by a generic landowner belonging 
to group j
•	 xj2: quantity harvested at time 2 by a generic landowner belonging 
to group j
•	 xNI1: quantity harvested at time 1 by a generic landowner 
Growing stock, carbon
balance, biodiversity,
recreational value
Impactanalysis
Owner type, growth rate
‘Actual’ felling, by owner type
Demand for primary wood productsMax sustain.
harvest
FRAM EVA
1
1
2
EMFS
Figure 8: EVA as part of a DSS.
belonging to group NI
•	 xI1: quantity harvested at time 1 by a generic landowner belonging 
to group I
•	 k: forest growth rate
•	 Q: initial forest endowment
•	 D1: time 1 demand for wood
•	 D2: time 2 demand for wood
•	 pi: price at which wood harvested at time i is sold on the wood 
market
•	 p1: price at which wood harvested at time 1 is sold on the wood 
market 
•	 p2: price at which wood harvested at time 2 is sold on the wood 
market
•	 b: risk-free rate
•	  εa: long-run economic shock 
•	 εD: time 1-contingent shock
•	 ε2: time 2-contingent shock 
•	 σa²: variance of the long-run economic shock εa
•	 σD²: variance of time 1-contingent shock εD
•	 σ2²: variance of time 2-contingent shock ε2
•	 m: price variation coefficient
•	 s: signal
•	 εs : noise of the signal
•	 σs²: variance of the noise εs
•	  β: fraction of the owners’ population that observes the signal
•	 α: degree to which the signal is specific to the entire time horizon
•	 γ p: informativeness of the signal with respect to the timber price
•	 γ D: informativeness of the signal with respect to the timber 
demand
•	 Ωj: time 1 available information a generic landowner belonging 
to group j
•	 pI*1: expected equilibrium price at time 1 for a landowner 
belonging to group I 
•	 pNI*1: expected equilibrium price at time 1 for a landowner 
belonging to group NI
•	 p*1: expected market time 1-equilibrium price
•	 q: degree of patience with respect to postponing harvesting 
income
•	 wqj: weighted wealth at time 2 for a landowner belonging to group 
j with patience coefficient q
•	 rUD: risk-aversion coefficient for the “Urban Dweller” category
•	 rGV: risk-aversion coefficient for the “Green Value” category 
•	 rEM: risk-aversion coefficient for the “Economic Man” category
•	 rMO: risk-aversion coefficient for the “Multi Objective” category
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•	 rEC: risk-aversion coefficient for the “Elderly Couple” category
•	 qUD: patience coefficient for the “Urban Dweller” category
•	 qGV: patience coefficient for the “Green Value” category 
•	 qEM: patience coefficient for the “Economic Man” category
•	 qMO: patience coefficient for the “Multi Objective” category
•	 qEC: patience coefficient for the “Elderly Couple” category
•	 σ2UD: inverse of the degree of confidence in the policy maker 
patience coefficient for the “Urban Dweller” category
•	 σ2EM: inverse of the degree of confidence in the policy maker 
patience coefficient for the “Economic Man” category
•	 σ2MO: inverse of the degree of confidence in the policy maker 
patience coefficient for the “Multi Objective” category
σ2EC: inverse of the degree of confidence in the policy maker 
patience coefficient for the “Elderly Couple” category
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